Civil Society in Namibia: History, Context and Possibilities (Part 4)

ANDRÉ DU PISANI WRITES:

In liberal, and even more so in libertarian political thought (such as in the case of Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia, the idea of civil society rests on a number of key defining features. These include, among others: activism, autonomy, democracy, accountability, social cohesion, and voluntarism.

The adoption of neo-liberal policies thus becomes the sine qua non of civil society. But: how autonomous are some of the local "civil society" agencies? How accountable are they and to whom? How democratic are they in their politics and decision-making?

How should we understand Namibian civil society in the context of the consolidation of democracy in this country?



QUESTIONS ABOUT ­INDEPENDENCE

What many analysts fail to see is the complex process of how the Namibian "democracy" has systematically since 1990, incorporated parts of "civil society" – most of the public service, organized labour, the National Youth Council (NYC), part of the churches, the universities, most traditional leaders, community leaders of many local leaders of conservancies, the Namibia Sport Commission, and parts of the business class, some of the economic elites – the "tenderpreneurs", those who form part of the "economics of affection"

Like in South Africa, it is simply too much of an over-simplification to classify civil society types, based on their relationship to the state, from "accommodationist" to "adversarial". While the former may be sub-contracted by the Namibian State to fulfill a number of functions from which it has withdrawn, it remains doubtful to refer to such organizations as NGOs, when they are not only funded by government, but operate on the basis of the same subjectivity and political mantra, and in fact undertake state functions. As Neocosmos (2016) argued in the case of South Africa, one is entitled to question the whole idea of an independent civil society in this instance, as the distinction between such NGOs and state institutions, is simply a legal one, a state distinction.

This paper argues that in common with many other "new" democracies in other parts of the world, Namibian "democracy" is an interlocking network of elite and party interests – a partial regime – rather than a unified system based upon clear lines of accountability and a common consensus on values.

The nature of this "partial regime" is determined by the "action situations" in which political actors are engaged, and this make parts of civil society extensions of the State. The "electoral regime" structures relations between the legislature and political parties, while the "corporatized regime" organizes the political role of particular interests, such as capital and labour.

Clearly, some of the elements of the "partial regime" rely on restrictions upon associational freedom. In the case of Namibia, the exit options and political space of trade unions are limited within the agreement unions have with the governing party.

Also, the "clientelist regime", centered on the personal networks constructed by party functionaries, is formed on the basis of exclusive instead of inclusive participation of relevant social actors, thereby violating a key constitutive principle of democratic politics.



INTERESTS AND ­CONTRADICTIONS

In the Namibian body politic, there is a tendency among some "civil society" actors, such as those in the print and electronic media and in human rights organizations, to invest themselves with unambiguous virtue to perform their functions.

In the context of the former Soviet Union, the celebrated British sociologist Ernest Gellner, famously remarked, that the virtue of civil society lies in it being “an A-moral order”. For to invest civil society with a moral dimension is not only to misrepresent its historical role in the regulation of social and political life, but also to deprive it of its capacity to express, and thereby paradoxically to contain, the aspirations for power, influence, and control over truth which are defining features of politics.

For many analysts and politicians in this country, civil society emerges as a sort of political ombudsman, reflecting the values of impartiality, fair play, and commitment to public welfare. Such an understanding of civil society fails to recognize its class divisions, its interests and its own contradictions. Perhaps this uncritical understanding of civil society reflects not only its de-politicization and "sanctification", but also its bureaucratization.

Allow me briefly to return to John Locke. Locke memorably argued that a "civil society" "the state liked" is possible. For Locke, "civil society" was a "lively associational realm between state and family".

For contemporary liberals in the North and West, a free and flourishing associational realm can improve communication between citizens and their governments, raise public morality, contribute towards a more satisfactory balance of powers, and in these ways shape a more accountable democracy. This, unfortunately, as this paper has argued, is an answer that misreads the constraints on politics and democracy in this country.

In Namibia, for example, not every citizen and all communities have benefited equally from the extensions of citizenship. The reasons are in part economic.



MODEST INFLUENCE

In Namibia, success on the part of civil society has been modest. Some of the professional associations in this country are caught between their desire for influence and their wish to remain independent of any party and of government.

This is not to say that no civil society organizations have been able to advance their interests, but: where they have, they have done so from conditions in which a "wider civil society" does not exist. The larger problem for Namibian politics, in the longer term, is the fact that large parts of the peasantry and the rural-dwellers are mainly untouched by the activities of "civil society" organizations.

Since independence, there have been some worthy examples where particular civil society organizations have had an influence on policy, bills and laws in areas as diverse as education, gender, media, statistics, and the environment. Two notable examples have been the 1992 Windhoek Declaration on Pluralistic Media, in which local media practitioners played a key role with the support of international agencies, and the Beijing Platform on Gender. Both of these came shortly after independence and have not yet been equaled since.

Perhaps, it had much to do with a newly-independent State that wished to behave as a "norm-entrepreneur".

Some "civil society" organizations do indeed provide deliberative space for a raft of issues such as sea-bed phosphate mining, the need for a national integrity system, environmental management, law reform, poaching for mega-animals, and trade and commerce.

At the same time, it has to be recognized, that foreign political foundations such as the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation (KAS), the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) and the Hans Seidel Foundation (HSF) not only collaborate with local "civil society"organizations, but also assist these with finance, capacity building and knowledge, and fulfill some of the functions associated with "civil society" such as serving as a fulcrum for public debate.

Given the nature of politics in this country, there is in a particular sense still a need "to search for civil society". Yes, civil society functions as part of the alternative to a "state of nature" in the sense that Thomas Hobbes understood it as a "war of all against all".

But: it is perhaps the relative independence of the Judiciary and the degree to which the Constitution has retained its integrity, that accounts for this and not merely the existence of elements of a civil society, for large parts of the peasantry and rural dwellers are mainly untouched by the activities of civil society.